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Abstract 
Forty years after development of the original agency theory by Jensen and Mecklin, firms have evolved and 
created convoluted structures in order to subsist the turbulent environment that the business world has become. 
Consequently, the 21st Century has seen emergence of corporates with webs of direct and indirect interests in 
form of ownership and other interests. This paper reviews the original agency theory, its consequent 
developments and the extent to which it applies to firms with indirect ownership. I use the case of collective 
investment schemes to demonstrate that the agency theory in its initial postulations explicates the agency 
problems in firms with direct ownership but fails to explain the agency intricacies in firms with indirect 
ownership and interests. As such I propose an indirect agency theory that provokes thought on the problems, 
entitlements and reactions of indirect stakeholders to corporate governance lapses. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Key developments in the 21st Century include unprecedented growth in institutional investors. Key amongst 
these institutional investors are collective investment schemes such as mutual funds, unit trusts and insurance 
companies amongst others. These institutions pool funds from individual investors and small firms and invest on 
their behalf. The original investors therefore have indirect interests in the investment vehicles that the collective 
investment schemes choose to invest in.  
Institutional investors were reported to own 70% of the equity of U.S corporations (Gaspar, Massa, 
Matos, Patgiri, & Rehman, 2013) and over 50% of the equity of European companies (Brossard, Lavigne & 
Sakinc, 2013). Willis Towers Watson (2016) conducted a study on 19 major pension markets and estimated the 
values of the assets at USD 35316 billion at the close of 2015 representing an average of 80% of the GDP of the 
countries – with Australia, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK and US recording pension asset values in excess of 
100% of their GDP. The study further names the largest pension markets as US, UK and Japan with 61.5%, 9% 
and 7.7% of the total pension assets. Of the total pension assets, Willis, Towers and Watson show that 44% were 
held in equities, 29% in bonds and 24% in other assets. In Africa, South Africa led the pack in 2015 with pension 
assets amounting to USD 181 billion (Willis Towers Watson, 2016). Ashiagbor and Vidal (2016) estimate the 
pension assets in other African countries to be worth USD 25.8 billion in Nigeria, USD 8.1 billion in Kenya, 
USD 7.8 billion in Namibia, and USD 5.6 billion in Botswana. The Investment Company Institute places the 
value of total worldwide assets invested in regulated open end funds at $37.2 trillion at the end of 2015. In the 
US, the investment companies’ total net assets amounted to $18.1 trillion held in mutual funds ($15.7 trillion), 
exchange traded funds ($2.1 trillion), closed end funds ($261 billion) and unit investment trusts ($94 billion). 
Further expansion of the industry has led to the development of cross-border mutual funds. Consequently, there 
is need for advancement of mechanisms to protect investors who put their funds in the collective investment 
schemes.  
In the last four decades, agency theory has been predominantly used to explain relationships between 
management and ownership and has been used as the bedrock for the development and application of corporate 
governance principles (Mamun, Yasser & Rahman, 2013). This has been exemplified in large firms with 
disaggregated ownership that require a higher level of monitoring of managers as they have greater space to take 
excessive risks at the expense of the shareholders.  
The popularity of collective investment schemes amongst individuals and small firms lies in their 
ability to harness economies of scale, diversify risk, reduce transaction costs, conduct research and make 
informed investment decisions. However the collective investment schemes limit the choices that investors can 
make with regard to investment vehicles and the loss of investor’s rights in the corporates.1  
Berle and Means (1932) document that as long as there is separation of ownership and control the 
industry becomes consolidated and hence reduces oversight checks on abuse of power. Such is the case in the 
financial services industry in most countries that are dominated by few firms mostly precipitated and executed 
through mergers and acquisitions. For instance, Deloitte (2016) document that merger and acquisition deals 
valued at £265.1 billion were reported by the end of the third quarter of 2015 in the financial services industry. 
The author documents three trends in the industry namely; market disruption and technology, size and regulatory 
                                                 
1 Investors in collective investment schemes lose the right to attend annual general meetings and vote as their funds are 
invested through the collective investment scheme. 
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changes. 
In essence, collective investment schemes have many agency and contractual relationships, key 
amongst them being the relationship between them and the companies in which they invest in. The fact that the 
collective investment schemes invest the overall wealth in many diversified companies to minimize risk 
complicates their monitoring role of the decisions that corporates take. This situation exposes the investors in the 
collective investment schemes who in many cases have incomplete information and small stakes that make 
active monitoring inefficient. Khismatullin and Kharisova (2014) argue that the financial crises in the 21st 
Century exposes the weaknesses of the market for collective investment. As a result, corporate failures such as 
Enron, WorldCom and Marconi have led to reduced trust amongst the shareholders (Mir & Seboui, 2008). With 
collapse of such companies, indirect shareholders are always at a loss as they do not have priority ranking during 
bankruptcy.  
This paper proposes an indirect agency theory that can explain the reactions of and rights of investors in 
collective investment schemes. I develop the theory in phases where section 2.1 provide in-depth analysis of the 
inventive agency theory, section 2.2 explains other theories that are woven around the classical agency theory. In 
section 3, I evaluate the application of the classical agency theory and other theories discussed in section 2.2 to 
collective investment schemes and unearth the limitations that these theories have in explaining the 
circumstances that indirect investors face. In section 4, I argue the case for an indirect agency theory to explain 
the position of indirect investors. In section 5, I make conclusions and propose areas where empirical data can be 
applied to test application of the indirect agency theory. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Original Agency Theory 
Adam Smith developed the original theory of the firm in 1776 arguing that inclusion of more than one 
individuals in the control of a firm causes suboptimal results to the owners as the objectives are diluted rather 
than achieved idyllically. Later, Berle and Means (1932) introduced the discussion on separation of management 
and ownership.  Picking up the discussion, Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the classical agency theory 
that view managers as agents of the shareholders, who driven by the motive to maximize their interests fail to act 
in the best of the interests of the shareholders.  
From the agency theory perspective, contractual relationships between principals and agents become 
critical in the prevention of excesses by the agents, consequently principals must provide incentives or bond 
agents and bear the residual losses in order to minimize value decreasing decisions taken by the managers on 
behalf of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) thus conceptualized agency costs that principals must incur to 
safeguard their interests as monitoring costs (auditing and performance measurement), bonding costs (profit 
share with managers) and residual losses (residual costs of recruiting managers and dilution).  
Agency problems arise when information is obscured from the principals by the agents, agents pursue 
personal interests at the expense of the principals, agents set goals that contradict the corporate objectives and 
take excessive risk that is often borne by the principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
2.2 Other Theories 
2.2.1 Stewardship theory 
The steward theory is rooted in psychology and sociology and was developed by Donaldson and Davis in 1991. 
It portrays managers as ethical curators who will maximize the returns of a firm in good faith and without self-
seeking. The theory contrasts the agency theory by postulating that managers are superb stewards who, given an 
opportunity will act to the best of the interests of the firm and will align their interests with those of the firm 
(Donaldon & Davis, 1991; Block, 1996; Peggy & Hugh, 1997) hence no conflicts exist between managers and 
owners. While the theory fails to advance the motivation that such managers would have to achieve 
organizational objectives, Smallman (2004) suggest that the benefits will be consequent to the achievement of 
organizational success as a result of organizational and individual goal convergence. Achievement of the firm’s 
objectives results to satisfaction of the stakeholders (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) in a context where 
there is balance of powers in the leadership of the board. Applied to agency, stewardship theory provides for the 
separation of powers, internal checks and the concept of CEO duality since according to Caldwell and Karri 
(2005) there are conventional duties that managers owe to the stakeholders. Stewardship thus places the long 
term interests of the firm ahead of the self-interests of the managers hence ignoring individualism consequently 
aligning their personal objectives with those of the firm (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). To succeed through the 
theory principals must trust agents, refrain from exercising undue influence on them and hire competent and 
honest managers. Trust, open communication, managerial empowerment, long-term orientation and performance 
enhancement are the critical pillars which support stewardship (Davis et al, 1997).   
2.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder theory is based on the notion that a corporate entity exists to serve its broad range of 
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stakeholders who are primarily the shareholders (Abrams, 1951) granted that the firm impacts on parties who are 
external to it either directly or indirectly (McDonald & Puxty, 1979; Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995; Sundaram 
& Inkpen, 2004). Firms therefore have an obligation to identify the stakeholders (whether contextual or 
contractual) and their specific needs (Lashgari, 2004; Coleman, Hacking, Stover, Fisher-Yoshida & Nowak, 
2008) and develop policies to address these concerns. Agency from this perspective is the framework that 
ensures that the often conflicting interests of the stakeholders who have delegated their duties to managers are 
addressed in a fair manner by the firm, principally because managers have resources and capability to deal with 
the company’s internal governance delinquencies (Hosmer, 1996; Freeman, 2004).  
The primary role of the managers under the theory is to create value for shareholders since they have a 
legitimate claim on the firm’s assets. Etzioni (1998) documents that this right should be extended to other 
stakeholders namely; employees, community, lenders, industry and government amongst others. Goodpaster 
(1991) agrees with the view but observe that the ethical duty that managers have to the shareholders differs with 
the one they have to the other stakeholders and boldly states that they only owe fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders.   
2.2.3 Resource dependency theory 
The main tenet of the resource dependency theory is the environmental linkages existing between the firm and 
external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that are important for the firm’s survival (Daily, Dalton & Canella, 
2003). The theory places the responsibility of raising corporate resources (finance, information, skills and critical 
networks) on the directors (Hillman, Canella & Paetzold, 2000; Rodriguez, Ricart & Sanchez, 2000) and 
therefore requires them to be astute and provide their own specialized expertise in the management of corporate 
affairs with a view of reducing transaction costs associated with hiring these resources from external providers 
(Abdulla & Valentine, 2009). The resource dependency view supplements the agency view by focusing on the 
need for a board of directors with diversified skills, appointment of independent directors and continuous 
training of the board.  
2.2.4 Political theory 
The political theory derives its postulate from exercising influence through voting (Pound, 1993). Corporates 
have long history of control by ownership through shares hence corporate decisions are influenced by the 
majority determined by the ownership structure. The political theory determines who will serve in the board, 
powers and privileges that the board will have and the consequent strategic direction that the firm will take. The 
political theory therefore contributes directly to corporate governance practices of the firm (Abdulla & Valentine, 
2009). Lashgari (2004) suggests that shareholder activism, that is a reaction to agency problems, derives its 
legitimacy from the political theory as the level of activism depends on the decisions taken by the board that is 
appointed through the political process. 
2.2.5 Virtual ethics theory 
The virtual ethics theory is about “moral excellence, goodness, chastity and good character” (Abdulla & 
Valentine, 2009, pp. 93) that is a matter of individual choices, which according to Aristotle comes from 
theoretical and practical knowledge. Accordingly, virtue ethics are multi-track personalities that influence 
emotional reactions, choices, values, desires and perceptions (Hursthouse, 2013). Proponents of the theory argue 
that positive feelings are a function of doing the right things and are exhibited by individuals. Bowden (2005) 
however argue against the theory insisting that it is built on a “false base”, does not result to fulfillment and is 
not an answer when making complex moral decisions. In the context of agency, virtual ethics may inform the 
need for an educated and experienced board and the desire to conduct proper and fit tests (tests of character, 
competence and capability) before appointment in to the board to minimize the agency problem.  
2.2.6 Discourse theory 
On its part, the discourse theory of ethics focuses on establishment of the right, moral and political principles 
emerging from certain ideal conditions (Jones, 1997). It emphasizes on conflict resolution through 
communication where parties are deemed to be equals, absence of coercion in dispute resolution, rationality in 
argument in addition to open ended communication (Harbemas, 1990). Discourse theory complements agency in 
two ways firstly; two-way communication with stakeholders is viewed and is widely accepted as a key tenet of 
corporate governance and secondly; agency focuses on resolution of potential conflicts that inherently arise 
between managers and the shareholders. 
 
3.0 Application of the Agency and other Theories to Collective Investment Schemes 
Starting from the classical studies by Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986), a 
number of other studies have authenticated application of the agency theory in different milieus, for instance, 
Chetty and Saez (2007) use its propositions to develop a model for the efficiency cost of dividend taxation; 
Krueger (1991) and Kehoe (1996) used it to analyze franchising in the fast foods industry and US hotel industry 
respectively; Amihud and Lev (1981), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997, 1999); Amihud and Lev (1999); 
Ramaswany, Li and Veliyath (2002) and Elyasini and Jia (2010) used the theory to test the effect of equity 
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ownership structure on corporate diversification strategies. Lane, Canella and Lubatkin (1998; 1999); Aggarwal 
and Samwick (2003) tested the effect of agency on diversification. Additionally, Barnhart and Rosenstein (1999) 
used it to reflect the relationship between board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Krishna and Loch (2005) used it to analyze technology strategy in new product development. 
Despite its validation, most of the empirical studies conclude that without close monitoring by 
shareholders, managers adopt self-seeking behaviour and make value destroying decisions (Denis et al, 1997, 
1999; Ramaswamy et al, 2002). Moreover, the changes in business environment and the presence of self-seeking 
managers forces shareholders and regulators to develop ethical responsibility, codes of conduct to control 
behaviour of managers and managerial incentives following the stipulations of the agency theory (Mumin et al, 
2013). It however does not cover all aspects of corporate governance (Mumin et al, 2013). 
Although the prominence of monitoring in the contractual agency relationship is underscored by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), they fail to detail the process of efficient monitoring for a firm as they do not provide an 
explanation of how firms structure themselves to take charge of the agency problem. Additionally, Fama (1980) 
postulates that the discipline of the market combined with internal and externa influences will dictate managerial 
reactions. 
What complicates indirect agency in the context of collective investment schemes? Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) were of the view that to mitigate the principal-agent conflict, ownership structure must be concentrated 
and the firm must set up outcome based incentives. The inherent design of collective investment schemes is such 
that the two conditions cannot be fulfilled since most of the investors in these schemes are disaggregated and 
hold a paltry stake and are not able to influence development of performance based remuneration. The 
monitoring of directors by shareholders is accentuated where the shareholders hold large proportion of equity 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Denis et al, 1999), which is not the case with collective investment schemes. 
As a result, special agency problems arise in the case of investment in collective investment schemes or 
pooled funds. It is expected that unit holders in a collective investment scheme will delegate the duty to invest 
and monitor to the managers of the collective investment schemes. Consistent with the agency theory and the 
arguments in Fama and Jensen (1983); Boyd (1995) and Ahmed (2008), managers of collective investment 
schemes and those of the corporates that they invest in may be self-seeking, have little or no interest in outcome 
of decisions they make and hence invest in value decreasing activities. The decrease in value of the corporate 
will be borne by the investors in the collective investment schemes who have an indirect stake in the corporate 
that they did not prima facie participate in the decision to invest in. This aspect is complicated by the fact that 
the traditional choices of voice, loyalty and exit – towards the corporate are not options to the investor in the 
collective investment scheme. In other words, the indirect investor cannot influence how the corporate in which 
the collective investment scheme is holding a stake will be exercised. This calls for an in depth scrutiny and 
development of a theory to explain the agency problems in an indirect investment relationship and the 
mechanisms that indirect investors can use to minimize their exposure to corporate risks as indirect investors do 
not have a way of disciplining corporate managers of firms that their wealth is indirectly invested in.  
The postulates of trust, open communication, managerial empowerment, long-term orientation and 
performance enhancement expounded by Davis et al (1997) in the stewardship theory fail to apply to indirect 
investors as they are not provided with information relating to the performance of the investment vehicles in 
which collective investment schemes have invested on their behalf. Even if the information was provided, 
indirect investors would still be at a loss as they are not prima facie investors in those firms. 
Theoretically, the interests of indirect investors are taken care of by the stakeholder’s theory in view of 
Etzioni (1998) definition of stakeholders. Since managers only have a primary duty to the immediate 
shareholders according to Goodpaster (1991), the indirect shareholders lose out. Even if corporates took care of 
collective investment schemes as their primary shareholders, there is no guarantee that the benefits obtained 
thereupon will be transferred to the investors in the schemes. Resource dependency too does not seem to create 
demand for the disaggregated resources held by micro and retail investors.  
The political theory further fails to position indirect investors as they lack the defense mechanisms of 
voice and exit. Their voices are so dispersed that meaningful changes in the corporate affairs and collective 
investment schemes would really not be achieved. Additionally, they are tied to punitive contracts that make exit 
suboptimal. Lastly, the virtue ethics and discourse theories are only voluntarily applied as there are no 
mechanisms to compel managers to act in the best of interests of the direct and indirect shareholders. 
 
4.0 Indirect Agency Theory 
Figure 1 conceptualizes the indirect relationship that investors in a collective investment scheme have in a 
corporate body in which the managers of the collective investment scheme choses to invest in. It depicts 
investors in a collective investment scheme as vulnerable stakeholders whose returns depend on the net returns 
generated by the collective investment schemes in a context of agency problems. 
Collective investment schemes have direct shareholders who form them to make profits defined as the 
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excess of returns generated from the investment vehicles they invest in less administrative costs and returns paid 
to the unit investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualization of the Indirect Agency Theory 
The investors in the collective investment schemes will typically be retail or small firms interested in 
maximizing returns in a context where they have little expertise on investment matters and financial market 
dynamics and may also be facing capital constraints such that a direct investment in the corporates and other 
investment vehicles becomes inefficient. Typically, these will be investors in a pension fund or unit holders in a 
mutual fund or a unit trust.  
The collective investment scheme is typically be a pension fund, insurance company or an investment 
management company that typically calls upon investors to accumulate their funds for collective investment in 
order to take advantage of economies of scale, diversify risk and consequently generate greater returns. The 
corporates and other investment vehicles will be the corporates and governments that are deficit agents who seek 
to raise equity and debt from the financial markets to bridge their funding gaps. 
Conventionally, it is expected that collective investment schemes will be better corporate monitoring 
agents than individual investors as they are more informed and have relatively bigger “collective” stake in the 
corporates, which would lead to better performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Bogle (2010) shows a different 
picture in the U.S where the schemes failed to control executive remuneration. In other instances they have been 
found to invest in companies with perceived better governance to avoid monitoring costs (Chung & Zang, 2011) 
consequently using a “hands off” approach.     
The returns on investment for the indirect investors depend on the value increasing decisions taken by 
the managers of the collective investment schemes and the corporates that the collective investment schemes 
invest in, making them stakeholders if the definitions of a stakeholder stated in Freeman (1984); Freeman (2004) 
and Friedman & Miles (2006) hold.  
The proposed indirect agency theory postulates that the investors in collective investment schemes face 
unique agency problems with regard to the corporates and other investment vehicles that the managers of their 
collective investment schemes seek to invest in (lend to). In the event that these corporates and governments 
undertake value decreasing activities, the investors in collective investment schemes lose out and do not have 
direct rights to these corporates as they are “strangers” to the investment contract. Following this thinking a few 
questions emerge namely; what are the rights of investors in a collective investment scheme? How can investors 
in a collective investment scheme protect themselves from corporate scandals in the corporates and other 
investment vehicles that their collective investment schemes have invested in? Are there market mechanisms that 
can protect these investors? Theoretical answers to these questions are included in sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 
respectively.    
 
4.1 Rights of Investors in a Collective Investment Scheme 
Granted that indirect investors are direct stakeholders in a collective investment scheme and indirect 
stakeholders in the corporates in which the collective investment schemes put their capital and following Craig 
(2010) assertions, they are entitled to information on the corporates where the collective investment schemes 
have put their funds. The transparency in provision of information would help to increase expected returns (Gray, 
Owens & Adams, 1996). Three common problems would however arise; firstly, it is not clear what information 
would be useful to the investors (Craig, 2010) secondly most of the investors would not be able to effectively use 
this information to inform future decisions due to limited analytical ability and previous contracts that could 
Investors in collective 
investment schemes 
Collective Investment 
Schemes 
Corporates and other 
investment vehicles 
Shareholders of investment 
companies 
Corporate shareholders 
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forbid or severely penalize exit for instance in a life insurance contract or investment in a unit trust and lastly the 
information provided could be false and thus mislead the decisions that the investors make. It could appear 
prudent to enforce the following rights for the investor; to receive unit certificates within a reasonable time and 
be supplied with information on investment policies and objectives of the collective investment scheme. 
 
4.2  Indirect investors’ self-protection mechanisms 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that an indirect shareholder have little or no remedies against a poorly 
managed corporate in which the collective investment scheme has invested their funds as the voice and exit 
options are not optimal solutions. The only remedy would be to sue the trustees of the collective investment 
schemes, in negligence. This would typically require the investor to prove the breach of the duty of care – a 
difficult proposition to demonstrate in a market with incomplete information. Additionally, indirect investors 
would need to get training on investment matters, actively seek information and lobby for regulatory enactment 
and enforcement.   
 
4.3 Market mechanisms for protection of indirect investors 
It appears that regulation can result to better protection of the indirect investors. Regulation is however only 
useful in the management of non-market risks (Khismatullin & Kharisova, 2014). Regulation should also 
establish a procedure for compensation in bankruptcy and protect the investors against false information supplied 
by the corporates. Additionally, audit of financial statements and risk disclosures should be made mandatory 
because of the high public importance. Lastly, Khismatullin and Kharisova (2014) propose insurance, which if 
necessary will make compensation to the losers. 
 
5.0 Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
This paper has provided theoretical backing of the classical agency theory and the nexus it has with other related 
theories. The arguments expounded lead to the conclusion that the classical theories provide explanations for 
managerial and shareholder behaviour where direct investment in a corporate exist. Investors in a collective 
investment scheme are broadly left exposed yet they are indirect investors in the eventual corporates where their 
funds are invested. The development of an indirect agency theory would stimulate thinking on strategies that can 
be adopted to maximize the welfare of the indirect investors. Financial market regulation should develop towards 
protection of these investors who are increasing by the day in an intricate financial world. 
The arguments provided in this paper are not backed by empirical data. It would therefore be prudent to 
subject the assertions of the indirect agency theory to empirical research. Further research should collect 
empirical data on the regulatory measures implemented to protect these investors from the regulator’s 
perspective. Additional empirical research should focus on the investors to establish the self-protection 
mechanisms that they have put in place.   
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